Abstract. p-Cycle protection is a fairly new survivability scheme that has the interesting properties of offering restoration speeds essentially the same as those offered by ring protection while requiring almost as little redundant capacity as adaptive mesh restoration [D. Stamatelakis, W.D. Grover, IEEE Transactions on Communications, vol. 48, no. 8, (August 2000), pp. 1262-1265. This paper presents the first analytical consideration of the availability of paths in a network protected by p-cycles. Results confirm the importance that cycle sizes play in terms of availability and suggests principles or strategies for achieving high availability of paths in a network protected by p-cycles. Based on these insights, two new formulations for joint service path provisioning and capacity planning are proposed. The first one offers a way to improve the availability of selected service paths by using a different routing strategy for them than for regular service paths. The second formulation enables a new class of service paths that are offered two protection options instead of just one. That class of service paths is expected to see its availability improved in a quantum step way relative to the availability of paths having only one protection option.
Introduction

Background
Network survivability has been a topic of great importance for many years now, and various types of survivability schemes have been developed. Survivability schemes can be divided into two classes: protection schemes and restoration schemes. Protection refers to the type of schemes for which the details of the response to network failures are known in advance. In other words, with protection schemes, backup paths that will be used to replace failed working paths are preplanned and, upon a failure, the response can be as simple as switching two end-nodes to a preconnected and already operating backup path. Such pre-planned and pre-connected survivability schemes offer the fastest recovery possible to failures. With other protection schemes, however, the backup paths to be used in response to a failure may have to be cross-connected upon the occurrence of the failure, making the recovery slower. Restoration refers to schemes for which the details of the response to network failures are not known ahead of time and are determined adaptively in response to actual network conditions at the time of the failure. In other words, with restoration schemes, available backup paths -in this case referred to as restoration paths -are searched at the time of the failure, based on the current state of the network. Although it is often considered that ''protection means fast recovery'' and ''restoration means slow recovery,'' we need to stress that only pre-connected protection schemes offer a really significant advantage in terms of recovery speed over restoration mechanisms. The p-cycle protection mechanism is of that type [1] .
The objective of virtually all survivability schemes -either protection or restoration -is to guarantee the replacement of all affected service paths in the event of any single network failure. Most of the time, ''single network failures'' means single fibre cuts -or more generally, cuts of single edges of the network graph. An important topic of research related to network survivability is the development of methods to determine the location and the amount of extra transmission capacity that needs to be placed in the network to meet the requirement of full restorability of any single failure. This topic, referred to as spare capacity design, has been studied in several papers for p-cycle based networks [2, 3] .
Another topic of interest in network survivability is the analysis of the effects of failures on networks in which a survivability scheme and spare capacity plan is in place. Although networks that are fully restorable to single cuts are often termed ''100% restorable,'' there are still higher-order failure combinations from which such networks will not be able to recover fully. What this means is that making a network fully restorable to single failures is not a guarantee that the availability of service paths will be 100%. Being able to analyze the factors that affect and determine the availability of service is not just of interest from an academic standpoint; it has become a crucial capability for network operators that need to offer guarantees to their customers in terms of service availability. These guarantees are commonly specified in service level agreements (SLA) that, for instance, can specify the maximum total outage time tolerable per month for a given service. Typically, when the SLA is not realized on the service provider's side, the customer will receive free service in the following month. Given this, it is vital for network operators to have an accurate idea of the expected service availability they are providing to their customers in order to be able to offer competitive SLAs without taking too much risk of paying penalties. The question of analyzing service availability has been studied in detail already for ring-based survivable networks [4] , and for mesh-based survivable networks [5] , but it has not been studied yet for the case of p-cycle protection.
Scope of Paper
The first aim of this paper, treated in Section 2, is to develop an analytical expression for the availability of paths in networks using p-cycles as the protection mechanism. The model presented is based on the calculation of the unavailability caused by the effects of dual-failures. A detailed model is presented as well as a simplified model obtained using reasonable assumptions to limit the number of variables and allow numerical comparisons of the availability of two types of paths. We also analyze the influence of two main topological characteristics of the p-cycles used on path availability.
Based on the insights gained from the service availability expressions developed in Section 2, Section 3 introduces two new models for simultaneous path routing and capacity design (referred to as ''joint'' design models) for p-cycle networks that serve a class with higher availability requirements in addition to the traditional single-failureprotected class. With the first model, SEACP (Selectively Enhanced Availability Capacity Placement), the new class is offered higher availability simply by using a different routing strategy -inspired by results of the availability analysisfor service paths of that class. With the second model, the new class is offered a much higher availability improvement as it is provided with two protection options at every point of its travel, instead of just one, therefore making it logically protected against dual failures instead of just single failures.
Section 4 summarizes the findings and suggests related future developments.
p-Cycle Protection
The main principle of p-cycle protection is portrayed in Fig. 1 . A p-cycle, shown in Fig. 1(a) , is a closed path composed of spare capacity links 1 . When a failure occurs on a span covered by the cycle, the p-cycle provides one backup path for restoring one link on the failed span, as shown in Fig. 1(b) . In this regard, the p-cycle concept is identical to that of the well-known bi-directional line switched rings (BLSR), except that a p-cycle represents only one unit of protection capacity whereas a BLSR provides protection capacity at the line level. The main difference between rings and p-cycles is that p-cycles can also protect straddling spans -the spans that have both ends on the cycle but do not themselves lie on the cycleas shown in Fig. 1(c) and (d). This apparently minor difference has in fact a great impact on the capacity requirements of p-cycle protection, which achieves capacity requirements almost as low as those usually seen only with adaptive mesh-restoration [2, 3] .
The reason for the much higher capacity efficiency of p-cycles compared to rings is easy to pinpoint -although far from obvious at first -once one realizes that for a given cycle, a p-cycle not only has the potential to protect many more spans -all the straddling spans -, but it also provides two backup paths for theses extra spans, as opposed to just one for the on-cycle spans and straddling spans themselves require no spare capacity. From an operational point of view, p-cycles are again very similar to BLSRs as only a switching action at both ends a failed span is needed to restore the affected path(s). p-Cycles thus provide the efficiency of mesh with the speed of rings.
Literature Review
Numerous papers have been published on the p-cycle scheme, mostly in relation with the issue of optimizing the capacity placement required to support full restorability of the network to single span failures [2, 3] . More recently, some papers have been published on the question of determining and managing the effects of dual spanfailures on networks protected by p-cycles [6, 7] . These studies were conducted from the point of view of the restorability to dual-failures but no theoretical treatment of the analysis of servicepath availability has been published to date for the p-cycle scheme. The availability analysis of service paths has already been studied for ringbased networks in [4] , and for localized dynamic mesh restoration-referred to as span restoration -in [5] . In [4] , the availability of service is analyzed using an analytical approach that consists of determining all the combinations of dual-failures that will result in loss of service for a given path. The result is a closed-form model of path unavailability based on the expressions of interring unavailability and of intra-ring unavailability. In [5] and previously in [8] , it is shown that the nature of dynamic restoration makes it not practical to develop a precise closed-form model for the unavailability of paths in a span-restorable network, and that for such networks computational analysis is preferred to make any service availability prediction. These two papers also explain the relation that exists between path availability and the restorability of the network to dual-failures. The availability analysis for span restoration is therefore based on a detailed analysis of the restorability of the network to all dual span-failures scenarios. p-Cycle protection being a pre-planned survivability scheme like ring protection, the present study of path availability in p-cycle networks follows the same approach as the study in [4] .
Other publications relevant to the present study are by Schupke [6, 7] , where the restorability of p-cycle based networks to all dual span-failures or to selected dual span-failures belonging to sets of shared risk link groups (SRLG) is studied. He investigates how the number of cycles deployed and their diversity influence the restorability to dual span-failures.
More recently, we conducted another study with Schupke [9] , in which we investigated the possibility of improving the dual-failure restorability of p-cycle networks with various strategies using either static p-cycles (the p-cycles used are not changed after a failure), or reconfigurable p-cycles (after a failure, surviving and unused spare capacity can be reorganized to form new p-cycles that maximize the protection of the network against any subsequent failure). Some of the formulations in [9] can guarantee full protection of all served demands against any dual span-failure. Results of [9] show that, similarly to the case of dynamic mesh-restoration [10] , the amount of spare capacity required to protect all demands against any dual span-failure is typically in the order of three times the amount required to protect against single failures only, and the total capacity cost for the whole network would often increase by more than 50%. Since it is clear that this would be cost-prohibitive for most network operators, this paper investigates an alternative approach, which consists of improving the availability of only selected service paths instead of trying to improve the availability of all paths indistinctively. The study in [10] showed that this approach can give very interesting results for spanrestorable mesh networks. Indeed, in [10] , it was seen that with most test networks, up to 30 or 40% of service paths could be offered a guarantee of dual-failure restorability for a very minor increase in total capacity requirement. The question of whether the same strategy would give similar results in the case of p-cycle protection is therefore of great interest.
Theoretical Study of Path Availability
Assumptions
As explained in [5] , service path unavailability is determined by many factors including the statistics of network element failures, the statistics of repair times, mean restoration time, etc. A common and often most practical approach to determine service availability is to use the ''cutsets method,'' which consists of identifying categories of failure types that cause service outage and summing the probabilities of the most likely failure types to obtain an estimate of the expected average service unavailability. One important finding of [5] is that, while single span-failures are much more frequent than any other type of failures, their contribution to service path unavailability is extremely small in a fully restorable network because they only expose service paths to a small restoration time ''outage'' as opposed to the very long outage times (in the order of the time to physically repair a failure) experienced by paths when they are not restored during a dualfailure event. Simple calculations show that this is true whether restoration time is in the order of 50 ms or as long as 1 or 2 s. In other words, what this says is that restoration time is not the most important factor that determines the availability of service. Numerical examples in [5] show that the effects of dual span-failures are in fact much more important in the determination of expected service path availability in long-haul networks, and considering dual span-failures only is sufficient to obtain a good estimate of the expected availability of service 2 . Ignoring the contribution of restoration times to unavailability in p-cycle networks is even more reasonable because, as explained earlier, p-cycle restoration times are indeed expected to be in the order of 50-80 ms, not even 2 s. The present study is therefore based purely on the effects of dual span-failures and ignores the effects of restoration times.
Protection Domains
To develop the equations for path availability in a p-cycle protected network we now start by explaining the concept of protection domain. Between its origin node and destination node, a path crosses several protection domains, each of which is associated with a given cycle. For example, to say that a path p crosses a protection domain associated to cycle x means that, at some point, path p is protected by a p-cycle lying on cycle x. For each protection domain crossed (and its associated cycle,) the path is either straddling the cycle (it lies on a span that straddles the cycle, as explained in Section 1.3) or it is on-cycle, but it cannot be both. What we mean is that if path p is protected by a p-cycle on cycle x as an on-cycle path and also as a straddling path for the same cycle, these will count as two separate protection domains. If, however, on multiple on-cycle spans (or respectively straddling spans) for cycle x, path p is protected by p-cycles on cycle x, this will count as only one protection domain.
For a path p crossing a protection domain associated to cycle x, the following notations will be used:
Set of spans on cycle x S s x
Set of spans straddling cycle x S c p;x Set of spans on cycle x and on which path p is protected by a p-cycle on cycle x S s p;x Set of spans straddling cycle x and on which path p is protected by a p-cycle lying on cycle x.
Outage Causing Dual-Failure Sequences in Single p-Cycles
We now derive the set of all dual span-failure sequences that lead to outage for a given path in a p-cycle protected network. Each of these sequences is independent from the others, i.e., with respect to a given path a dual span-failure can only belong to one of these sequences. This will later facilitate the calculation of path availability since we will be able to add the probability of each of these sequences to determine the path unavailability. The first two dual span-failure sequences are for an on-cycle path p in a given protection domain. In Fig. 2 , we show the case of a first failure on the path itself followed by a second failure elsewhere on the cycle. Since p-cycles only offer one protection option for an on-cycle path, this is guaranteed to cause outage for the path. Obviously, the case where these two failures happen in the reverse order is also guaranteed to cause outage for the path. The combined probability of a failure sequence of this type (and the reverse one) is given by
where U s denotes the physical unavailability of spans in the network. This analysis assumes that each span has the same U s . This is because the aim here is to get a general understanding of what factors influence the most path availability in p-cycle networks. Extensions of the expressions developed in this paper to consider span-specific U s values would be fairly straightforward.
In Fig. 3 , we show the second type of dual spanfailure sequence that is guaranteed to cause outage for an on-cycle path p. In this case, a first spanfailure hits a straddling span and that span requires at least one protection path on the p-cycle protecting path p. Note that, unlike in the previous case, the same failure combination would not cause outage for path p if the failures happened in the reverse order since path p would be switched to the backup path (on the p-cycle) and that backup path would not be affected by the second failure. The probability of this second span-failure sequence is given by (2) . In that equation,P s x ; 1 represents the probability that the failure of a span straddling cycle x will require the use of exactly one backup path on a given p-cycle on cycle x and P s;2
x represents the probability that the failure of a span straddling cycle x will require the use of exactly two backup paths on a given p-cycle on cycle x. The 0.5 factor represents the probability that the straddling span failure happens first.
Pðseq. 2Þ ¼ jS
To continue, the following four dual spanfailure sequences are for a straddling path in a given protection domain. In the first sequence, portrayed in Fig. 4 , the first span failure affects the straddling path and the second failure hits the backup path of the straddling path. When an oncycle failure happens following restoration of a straddling path, there is on average a 50% chance that it hits the backup path used to restore the straddling path -that is because the backup path for the straddling path uses on average only half of the p-cycle. If the same failure combination happens but the order of the failures is reversed, then outage for the straddling path is guaranteed. Given this (un-ordered) combination of failures, the probability of outage for the considered path is therefore 75%. The combined probability of a sequence of this type (including the reverse order) is given by (3).
Figure 5 portrays the case where the first spanfailure happens on a straddling span not crossed by the straddling path and that span requires two backup paths on the p-cycle protecting the straddling path. The second path failure hits the straddling path and restoration of the straddling path is not possible since the p-cycle is already fully used for restoration of the first failure. For this failure combination, the reverse order would not cause outage for the straddling path. The probability of a failure sequence of this type is given by (4) . In that expression, the negative term in the left brackets accounts for the fact that if the path crosses multiple straddling spans of the p-cycle, some of these dual-straddling span failure combinations (the ones involving two straddling spans crossed by the considered path) would otherwise be counted twice. Pðseq. 4Þ ¼ S
The sequence illustrated on Fig. 6 shows a first span-failure affecting a straddling span not crossed by the straddling path considered, and that span requires only one backup path on the p-cycle protecting the straddling path considered (hence making this case independent from the previous sequence in which the first failed span required two backup paths). The second span failure affects the straddling path and the configuration of the backup path used by the first failure prevents a backup path for the straddling path to be used. In this particular case, the reason why a backup path cannot be found for the straddling path is that the first failed span is in a crossing situation with the second failed straddling span. Figure 7 illustrates the concept of crossing straddlers. In the left part of Fig. 7 , the network graph is represented as on every previous figure and one can see that the two failed straddlers in sequence 5 correspond to spans (2-6) and (4-7). On the right part of Fig. 7 , the network graph is redrawn to show the example p-cycle in expended form. On this representation of the graph, it appears clearly that span (2-6) and span (4-7) are crossing inside the cycle. For obvious reasons, even if both spans require only one backup path from the considered p-cycle, only one of the two spans can be offered a backup path at the same time.
The probability of a failure sequence of the type shown in Fig. 6 is given by (5) . In that equation, K x represents the percentage of crossing-straddler combinations out of all straddler combinations of cycle x.
Finally, Fig. 8 represents the sequence of a first failure occurring on a straddler not crossed by the straddling path followed by the failure of the straddling path on a span that is in a non-crossing situation with the first failed span. In this situation, there is only a 25% chance for the second failed link to be restorable -we assume that each straddling path has a pre-determined backup path for each span and cannot use the backup path on the other side of the p-cycle if the pre-determined backup path is not available. If the same failure combination happens in reverse order, path p will not suffer outage. The probability of a failure sequence of the type presented in Fig. 8 is given by (6).
Pðseq. 6Þ ¼ S
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Path Unavailability
The unavailability of a path in a p-cycle protected network can be expressed as the sum of the unavailability 3 of the path in the different protection domains crossed:
where O( p) is the set of protection domains crossed by path p and U p,o is the unavailability of path p in protection domain o. For a protection domain in which path p is an on-cycle path, we have:
For a protection domain in which path p is a straddling path, we have:
Some simplifications of the probability expressions can be made if we assume that P s;2 x is always 1, i.e. if all straddling spans require two backup paths on all p-cycles that can protect them. In that case, (2) becomes:
and (4) becomes
which can be simplified to:
Also, in that case, we have:
Finally, for a protection domain in which path p is an on-cycle path, we have: 
where x is the cycle associated to protection domain o. For a protection domain in which path p is a straddling path, we have:
These results can now be used to obtain various insights about routing through networks of p-cycles and compare to other schemes.
On-Cycle vs. Straddling Path Unavailability Comparison
In this section, we provide a comparison of the unavailability of a path in a given domain depending on whether the path is an on-cycle path for the cycle associated to that domain or a straddling path for that cycle. This comparison is based on (15) and (18). To allow comparison of the unavailability in both cases, we assume that S c p;x is 1 for the on-cycle path and S s p;x is 1 for the straddling path. What this means is that we assume that in both cases the path stays in the domain on a single span. As shown by (15) and (18), in both cases the unavailability of the path in the domain is directly proportional to the number of spans on which the paths stays in the domain (more generally, the total length). The results of the comparison will therefore remain valid with other values of S c p;x and S s p;x . The first factor we investigate is the number of on-cycle spans for cycle x associated to the domain. The unavailability of the on-cycle path and of the straddling path were calculated for a number of on-cycle spans varying from 4 to 20. For these calculations, the number of straddling spans was fixed to two and the average span physical unavailability, U s , was assumed to be 10 )3 . Results are shown in Fig. 9 . The results show that for both the on-cycle path and the straddling path, the unavailability grows proportionally to the number of on-cycle spans. For both cases, the unavailability with 20 on-cycle spans is 6.67 times higher than with four on-cycle spans. Results also show a significantly lower unavailability for the straddling path. The absolute difference between the availability of the on-cycle path and that of the straddling path increases with increasing number of on-cycle spans. In terms of percentage, the availability of the straddling path is 25% lower that that of the on-cycle path for all values of the number of on-cycle spans. In simple terms, the difference can be explained by the fact that on-cycle paths have longer backup paths and are therefore two times more exposed (on average) to the risk of having a secondary failure hit their backup path compared to straddling spans. As the number of on-cycle spans increases, the difference in average backup path length of on-cycle spans increases twice as fast as that of straddling spans, explaining the increasing absolute difference in unavailability.
With the values assumed for the different parameters, the resulting domain unavailability is in the order of 10 )5 , which corresponds to a statistical average of 5 min/year, or a 6 hour outage every 68.5 years. Figure 10 shows the effects of varying the number of straddling spans on the same two unavailability measures we just compared. The number of straddling spans was varied between 2 and 18 and we assumed 10 on-cycle spans and the same span physical unavailability as in the previous calculation. Here again, the unavailability of paths increases linearly with the increasing number of straddling spans but the increase is not as fast as with an increasing number of on-cycle spans. Between 2 and 18 straddling spans the unavailability of the on-cycle path increases by a factor 1.89 and the unavailability of the straddling path increases by a factor 2.21. The absolute difference between the unavailability measures for both types of paths remains constant in this case, which means that the relative different decreases as the number of spans increases, but with 18 straddling spans, the relative difference is still 18.9% in favor of the straddling path.
Insights Gained
These results tell us that the size of p-cycles plays a major role in determining the availability of service paths that traverse their domains. Small p-cycles will allow much higher availability to be offered to paths. Not surprisingly, limiting the size of p-cycles may also cause them to be less capacity efficient as shown in [4] . The size of eligible cycles used for p-cycle capacity design can therefore be used as a way to control the trade-off between capacity efficiency and availability. This trade-off is expected to look like the curve shown in Fig. 11 . As eligible cycles are allowed to be larger, the achievable capacity cost gets closer and closer to a global minimum (corresponding to the absolute minimum achievable when no restriction is placed on cycle sizes.) It is expected, however that after a certain point (in region A of the curve,) increasing the maximum allowed cycle size will not improve the capacity efficiency very much anymore -this is based on the same reasoning as the hop-limit concept in span restorable mesh network design as seen in [12] and [13] -, whereas the unavailability of paths will continue to increase linearly as seen in the previous section. Conversely, as the maximum allowed size of eligible cycles is reduced, the capacity cost will start increasing very rapidly (in region C) while the unavailability of paths will decrease linearly. Somewhere in the middle, we are likely to observe a region (region B of the curve)
where we get a more real trade-off between path unavailability and capacity cost (both characteristics will change significantly when the eligible cycle size is varied).
The results of the previous section also showed that the number of straddling spans does also matter for the availability of paths, but not as much as the number of on-cycle spans. Since the efficiency of p-cycles comes essentially from the protection of straddling spans, it seems clear that limiting the number of protected straddling spans in order to improve service availability would not be a good strategy, and would give only a small improvement of the path availability with high capacity penalties.
The other important finding is that the unavailability of paths that transit on the cycles that protect them is significantly higher than that of paths straddling the p-cycles. This observation is the basis for the first new capacity design and path provisioning strategy presented in the following section.
Path Provisioning with Enhanced Availability
This section draws on the results of Section 2 to propose new methods for service path provisioning and capacity placement for demands with higher availability requirements. Based on the observation that the availability of paths on straddling spans is higher than that of paths on on-cycle spans, a straightforward idea to improve the availability of paths in p-cycle networks is to allow protection of capacity only on the straddling spans or conversely to arrange paths or cycle choices so that priority services only ever traverse straddlers. In other words, paths would never travel on the cycles but always straddle them. While this strategy would certainly improve the availability of paths, it would inevitably also require much more capacity than the traditional p-cycle paradigm. This is the same problem encountered in previous studies that propose ways to improve the dual-failure restorability of p-cycle networks [6, 7] . Improving the restorability (or equivalently the availability) uniformly over all paths always requires large additions of capacity. Following the lines of [10] , a more practical and business-oriented principle is to improve the restorability only of selected ''priority'' service paths. For the present problem, that approach seems particularly appropriate: a new class of service (Gold-plus) can be created for demands with higher availability requirements, and only demands in that class will be restricted to travel exclusively on straddling spans, whereas other paths (Gold) will still be allowed to be routed either on on-cycle spans or on straddling spans, whatever turns out to be more beneficial from a capacity efficiency viewpoint. This is the idea of the formulation following in Section 3.2.
We will then present a second strategy that represents a more significant departure from the traditional principle of p-cycle protection. With that second strategy, demands of the class with higher availability requirements (Platinum) will also be restricted to straddling spans but, in addition, they will be offered two protection options instead of just one. More details will follow in Section 3.3.
Before going into details of the two proposals, we start this section with the definition of the notations used in the following sections.
Notations
The following notations are used for sets and parameters:
The objective of the formulation is to minimize the total amount of invested capacity as shown by (19). Constraint set (20) ensures that for every demand relation r in either protection class, there is enough flow over all eligible working routes to fully serve that demand. Constraint sets (21) and (22) ensure that the right amount of working capacity is allocated on each span k for the Gold and Gold-Plus protection classes respectively. Constraint set (23) guarantees that there are enough p-cycles in the solution to protect all working capacity units on all spans. To enforce the requirement that paths in the Gold-Plus class have to be routed on straddling spans only, constraint set (24) ensures that for each span i, the number of p-cycles that span i straddles is enough to protect all working capacity units in the Gold-Plus class. (Note that through constraint set (23), paths in the Gold class will be protected either by p-cycles they straddle or by p-cycles on which they lie.) Constraint set (25) makes sure that there is enough protection capacity allocated on all spans to support all p-cycles in the solution. Finally, constraint set (26) ensures that there is enough capacity placed on all spans to allow the allocation of working and spare capacity as imposed by (21), (22), and (25).
p-Cycle Multi-Restorability Capacity Placement (p-Cycle MRCP)
The approach proposed in this section is based on an evolution of the basic p-cycle principle in which p-cycles can either be used to offer two backup paths protecting two working links on any straddler -as in the normal p-cycle scheme -or two protection options for single working links on any straddler. The latter option can be used for protection of service paths with higher availability requirements. Based on previous studies [5, 14] , we know that offering two or more restoration options instead of just one leads to great improvements of the availability of service. This new class of service, that we will call the Platinum class, is therefore expected to enjoy extremely high availability and is almost guaranteed full restorability to any dual span-failures. The reason why we say ''almost'' will be clarified shortly, for now let us consider the illustration of the new p-cycle operation mode for the Platinum class shown on Fig. 12 .
The p-cycle shown in Fig. 12(a) is identical to all previous cases. It is composed of unit-capacity spare links. In Fig. 12(b) , a first failure occurs on a straddling span and we assume that the considered p-cycle protects one unit of Platinum-class working capacity on that straddling span. For that unit of Platinum-class working capacity, the p-cycle provides a first protection option and the other side of the p-cycle remains unused and still pre-connected. In Fig. 12(c) , a second failure occurs and hits the backup path used to restore the Platinum-class service path that had failed due to the first failure. In this case, the p-cycle provides a second protection option for the Platinum-class working link on the first failed straddling span.
Note that the second failure shown in Fig. 12 (c) cannot affect any Platinum-class working links that would require the same p-cycle for their restoration since Platinum-class working paths are restricted to straddling spans. Only a working link of Gold-class can be protected by that p-cycle on that second failed span, and since we are in a dual span-failure scenario it does not absolutely require protection. In fact, the only case in which a shortest routes by distance as eligible working routes for each node pair. For network 06n14s1 all eligible cycles were considered, whereas for the other two test networks we limited the number of eligible cycles to 1000 to keep solving times low. All results are based on a full CPLEX termination or a MIPGAP of under 0.001 (i.e., solutions are provably within 0.1% of optimal.) Figure 14 shows the results obtained for the three test networks with both formulation. The curves plotted in that figure show the increase in total capacity cost of the optimal capacity design solutions relative to the ''All Gold'' design for a varying percentage of priority demands. For each demand matrix tested (from 0% to 100% of priority demands by 10% increments) the percentage of priority demands was changed uniformly over all demand pairs. For the SEACP formulation, results show that it is possible to serve up to 60-70% of priority demands for a capacity penalty below 3%. As explained in the previous sections, priority demands with SEACP will benefit from an availability improvement in the order of what was observed in Section 2.5. This suggests that protecting straddlers is not only an advantage in terms of improving the capacity efficiency of the p-cycle scheme (compared to ring protection), but it could turn out as being the main way p-cycles are used. What we mean is that using straddlers to route demands (or equivalently choosing p-cycles that working paths straddle) could be the default option for most demands and routing demands on the p-cycles could be reserved for a small percentage of ''lower priority'' demands. Results of the MRCP formulation show that offering two protection options on each span along priority paths is much more costly, as compared to SEA-CP, in terms of capacity requirements. This is quite different from case of the MRCP formulation for span restoration [10] in which results showed that we could serve up to 30-40% of high priority paths -which in that case are truly guaranteed restoration against dual-failures -for a very small capacity cost increase. The non-adaptability of the p-cycle mechanism considered herein contrast with the very high adaptability of span restoration -results in an immediate capacity requirement increase as soon as we introduce some priority demands. Depending on how much some customers would be ready to pay for the availability improvement that comes with the Platinum class, this MRCP design approach could however be a good strategy. It is interesting to observe that if only a small fraction of customers opt for the Platinum class -as it is usually the case when the cost is significantly higher -the likelihood of the second backup path of a Platinum demand not to be available will be expected to be small, bringing that class even closer to a true dual-failure protected class.
Conclusion and Future Work
This paper has presented the first analytical treatment of the availability of paths in p-cycle networks. The results presented show the key importance of cycle size for the resulting path availability. Indeed, increasing the size of p-cycles results in a direct linear increase of the unavailability of paths. Using smaller cycles is therefore preferable in terms of availability of paths, although this was shown to degrade the capacity efficiency of the p-cycle mechanism by previous studies. This paper also shows the advantage of routing paths on straddling spans as opposed to on-cycle spans. The examples of path unavailability calculation presented suggest that a path that is systematically routed on straddling spans enjoys a 18-25% lower unavailability than a path that is routed on on-cycle spans only. Based on the insights provided by these results, we then presented two new formulations for demand routing and capacity design for p-cycle based networks. The first one, SEACP, can guarantee that selected priority paths will be routed exclusively on straddling spans, therefore enjoying an availability improvement, whereas other paths are routed either on straddling spans or on on-cycle spans. The second one, MRCP, offers two protection options to selected priority paths by routing them on straddling spans and allowing them to access either sides of the cycle they straddle. Design results show that a fairly large proportion (60-70%) of priority paths can be served for a quite small capacity requirement increase with SEACP, whereas with MRCP capacity requirement increase rapidly with an increasing proportion of priority demands. However, the availability of priority paths with MRCP is expected to be very much higher than that of priority paths with SEACP.
Future work on this topic will be to study the availability of priority paths with MRCP depending on the proportion of these priority paths. In particular it will be important to measure the frequency of cases where the second backup path is not available for a priority demand and to determine the impact of such scenarios on the availability of priority paths.
Notes
1. What we call links in this work are unit capacity transmission channels, not to be confused with spans which refer to the set of all links connecting two adjacent nodes of the physical transmission network graph 2. For example, five restoration switching times per year of 2 s each in response to single failures contribute a total unavailability of 3.17 · 10 )7 each, but a single exposure in ten years to a 6 h outage due to unrestorability in the face of a dual failure contributes 6.84 · 10 )5 to the path unavailability. 3. The sum of unavailabilities is a well-established and wellverified approximation for the product of availabilities where all availabilities being considered are in practice close to 100% [11] .
